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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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The Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA):  
Rethinking the Application of Cost-effectiveness Analysis, 
Multi-criteria Decision-making (MCDM) and the Analysis of 
Alternatives (AoA) in Defense Procurement 
Presenter: Presenter: Dr. Francois Melese joined the Naval Postgraduate School in 1987 and today is 
Professor of Economics at the Defense Resources Management Institute (DRMI). He has consulted 
extensively, most recently with the Joint Staff and the OSD. In 2008, he helped edit the DoD’s first 
Strategic Management Plan. He has published extensively on a variety of topics, including a co-authored 
paper entitled “A New Management Model for Government.” Results in implementing that model for the 
Joint Staff were recently published in the Armed Forces Comptroller. At the request of NATO HQ, Melese 
has represented the US as an expert in defense management and public budgeting throughout Europe. 




Our primary goal is to improve public investment decisions by providing defense 
analysts and acquisition officials a comprehensive set of approaches to structure an “Economic 
Evaluation of Alternatives” (EEoA). This study identifies a significant weakness in the Multi-
criteria Decision-making (MCDM) approach that currently underpins many contemporary AoAs. 
While MCDM techniques, and therefore most AoAs, correctly focus on lifecycle costs and 
operational effectiveness of alternatives, “Affordability” is often only implicitly addressed in the 
final stages of the analysis. In contrast, the adoption of EEoA encourages decision-makers to 
include affordability explicitly and up-front in the AoA. This requires working with vendors to 
build alternatives based on different funding (budget/affordability) scenarios. The key difference 
between the traditional MCDM approach to AoAs and the EEoA approach is that instead of 
modeling alternatives from competing vendors as points in cost-effectiveness space, EEoA 
models alternatives as functions of optimistic, pessimistic, and most likely funding (budget) 
scenarios. The Decision Map offered to practitioners to structure EEoAs provides a unique 
opportunity to achieve a significant defense acquisition reform—to coordinate the requirements 
generation system (JCIDS), Defense Acquisition System (DAS), and PPBE process, to lower 
the costs of defense investments, and improve performance and schedules. 
Introduction to the Problem: Making the Case for 
“Affordability” 
Our nation’s security, billions of taxpayer dollars, and the survival of our soldiers can all 
hinge on an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA).1 Routinely conducted by the US Department of 
Defense (DoD), the AoA is a key component of the defense acquisition process. Investment 
                                                
1 This study often uses the term “Analysis of Alternatives” (AoA) in its broad, generic sense. Although 
focused on defense acquisition, the results of the study apply to any public-sector procurement. It should 
be clear in context when the term AoAs references major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) as 
opposed to the acquisition of major automated information systems (MAISs).  
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decisions supported by AoAs help shape future forces, influence defense spending, and 
occasionally transform the defense industry.  
This study points to a significant weakness in the Multiple-criteria Decision-making 
(MCDM) approach that underpins many contemporary AoAs. The weakness is that while MCDM 
techniques, and therefore most AoAs, correctly focus on lifecycle costs and the operational 
effectiveness of individual alternatives, “Affordability” is an after-thought, often only implicitly 
addressed through a weight assigned to costs.  
In contrast, the approach recommended in this study encourages analysts and decision-
makers to include affordability explicitly in the AoA. This requires working with vendors to build 
alternatives based on different funding (budget/affordability) scenarios. Supported by a static, 
deterministic, multi-stage, constrained, optimization micro-economic production (procurement 
auction) model described in Section 3 (with the math relegated to the Mathematical Appendix 
available upon request), this “Economic Evaluation of Alternatives” (EEoA) explicitly addresses 
affordability up-front. The key difference between the MCDM approach to AoAs and the EEoA 
approach is that, instead of modeling decision alternatives from competing vendors as points in 
cost-effectiveness space, EEoA models alternatives as functions of optimistic, pessimistic, and 
most likely funding (resource/budget) scenarios. Given the current financial crisis and future 
public-spending challenges, affordability is a growing concern. As a consequence, it is 
imperative that the DoD gets the best value for every dollar it invests in major defense 
acquisition programs (MDAPs) or major automated information systems (MAISs).  
A brief review of the DoD’s high-level, fiscally constrained budget development and 
acquisition systems highlights the key role that affordability needs to play up-front in any AoA. 
The Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process is the principal decision 
support system used by the DoD to provide the best possible mix of forces, equipment, and 
support within fiscal constraints. Two other major decision support systems complement the 
PPBE process: a requirements generation system called the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) and the Defense Acquisition System (DAS).  
Based on strategic-level guidance (the National Security Strategy, National Military 
Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, Strategic Planning Guidance, etc.), the requirements 
generation system reviews existing and proposed capabilities and identifies critical capability 
gaps. To fill those capability gaps, senior leadership examines the full range of “doctrine, 
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities” (DOTMLPF) 
(CJCS, 2007, p. A-1; USD (AT&L), 2008, p. 14). 
Whenever a “materiel” solution is recommended, prospective military investments are 
identified that serve as the basis for AoAs that underpin the development of new acquisition 
programs in the Defense Acquisition System (DAS). The DAS provides principles and policies 
that govern major defense acquisition decisions and milestones. To ensure transparency and 
accountability, and to promote efficiency and effectiveness, various instructions (e.g., FAR, 
DFARS, DoD Directive 5000.01, DoD Instruction 5000.02, etc.) specify statutory and regulatory 
reports (e.g., AoAs) and other information requirements for each milestone and decision point. 
The primary purpose of PPBE is to make hard choices among alternative military 
investments necessary for national security within fiscal constraints. As we identify alternative 
materiel investments that can fill current capability gaps, the requirements generation process 
(JCIDS) naturally fits into the Planning phase of PPBE. 
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The first step in any investment analysis is to identify the derived demand for a key 
capability, program, or project. This is accomplished through the DoD’s requirements generation 
system (JCIDS). Ideally, user demands are expressed and refined in the Planning phase of the 
PPBE process. MDAP and MAIS proposals that emerge from JCIDS and the Planning process 
enter the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) and are incorporated in the Programming phase of 
PPBE. 
The Planning phase of PPBE establishes fiscally constrained guidance and priorities for 
military forces, including readiness, sustainability and modernization. This guidance provides 
direction for DoD Components (military departments and defense agencies) to develop their 
individual program proposals or their Program Objective Memorandum (POM) in the 
Programming phase. The POM details resource-allocation decisions (funding, personnel, etc.) 
proposed by each Component for its programs, projected six years into the future. DAS data for 
major defense acquisitions generally includes lifecycle cost estimates that project well beyond 
the six years of the POM. 
Senior leadership in the OSD and the Joint Staff subsequently review each Component 
POM to ensure it satisfies the Planning guidance, and that it can be integrated into effective and 
affordable overall defense programs. The Budgeting phase of PPBE occurs concurrently with 
the Programming phase. 
The Budgeting phase converts the Programming phase’s (output-oriented) view into the 
(input-oriented) format required by Congressional appropriation structures. While the DoD’s 
biennial defense budget projects funding only two years into the future, it includes more financial 
detail than the POMs. The Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller and the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) are responsible for reviewing budget submissions to ensure 
programs are affordable, i.e., satisfy current fiscal constraints. The GAO recognizes the major 
challenges faced by the DoD to “achieve a balanced mix of weapon systems that are affordable” 
(GAO, 2009, p. 5).2 
The primary focus of Multi-criteria Decision-making (MCDM), as traditionally applied in 
AoAs, is to evaluate the lifecycle costs and operational effectiveness of alternative defense 
investments. “An AoA is an analytical comparison of the operational effectiveness, suitability, 
and Life-Cycle Cost of alternatives that satisfy established Capability needs” (DoD, 2006, July 7, 
Section 3.3). This study emphasizes another key aspect—“Affordability.” 
In helping generate investment alternatives, and illuminating advantages and 
disadvantages of those alternatives, AoAs have the potential to contribute to requirements 
generation in the Planning phase of PPBE, and through DAS decision milestones, also in the 
Programming phase of PPBE. However, according to the GAO: “while JCIDS provides a 
framework for reviewing and validating needs […] the vast majority of capability proposals that 
enter the JCIDS process are validated or approved without accounting for resources [funding, 
budgets] […] that will be needed to acquire the desired capabilities” (GAO, 2009, p. 6).3  
                                                
2 According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), over the next 5 years, the DoD plans to 
spend more than $357 billion on development and procurement of major defense acquisition programs 
(GAO, 2009, p. 4). 
3 “A 2008 DoD directive established nine joint capability-area portfolios, each managed by civilian and 
military co-leads […]. However, without […] control over resources [funding/budgets], the department is at 
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We believe the GAO’s results reflect a weakness in the way AoAs have traditionally 
been structured. While AoAs provide a sharp focus on cost and effectiveness estimates of 
competing alternatives, the affordability (funding/budget realities) of the overall program is at 
best implicit, and usually conducted ex-post.4 This is reflected in the GAO’s concern that “at the 
program level, the key cause of poor outcomes is the approval of programs with business cases 
[e.g., AoAs] that contain inadequate knowledge about […] resources [funding] […] needed to 
execute them” (2009, p. 7).   
Yet DoD Directive 5000.01 explicitly states that, “All participants in the acquisition 
system shall recognize the reality of fiscal constraints […]. DoD components shall plan […] 
based on realistic projections of the dollars […] likely to be available […and] the user shall 
address affordability in establishing capability needs” (USD (AT&L), 2007, Enclosure 1, p. 5). 
For all major (ACAT 1) defense acquisition programs, an AoA is required at key 
milestone decision points (i.e., A, B, C). Affordability assessments are required at Milestones B 
and C for major defense acquisition programs and automated information systems (USD 
(AT&L), 2008, Enclosure 4, p. 40).  
According to the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, the purpose of an affordability 
assessment is to demonstrate that the program’s projected funding requirements are realistic 
and achievable.5 “In general, the assessment should address program funding over the six-year 
programming period, and several years beyond. The assessment should also show how the 
projected funding fits within the overall DoD Component plan” (DoD, 2006, July 7, Section 
3.2.2.).6  
The Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA) essentially embeds an explicit 
affordability assessment into an AoA. In preparing affordability assessments, one possible 
source of data is the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).7 According to the Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook, affordability assessments should provide details as to how excess 
                                                                                                                                                          
risk […] of not knowing if its systems are being developed within available resources [funding/budgets]” 
(GAO, 2009, p. 11). 
4 “Typically, the last analytical section of the AoA plan deals with the planned approach for the cost-
effectiveness comparisons of the study alternatives” (DoD, 2006, July 7, Section 3.3). Note that there is 
no mention of “affordability,” but instead only an ex-post cost-effectiveness trade-off that implies a 
concern for affordability. Moreover, this trade-off occurs at the end of a process in which alternatives 
under consideration have been developed independently of any cost/budget/funding/affordability 
constraint. The US Marine Corps (PA&E) has a similar approach to structuring an AoA. 
5 Since this assessment requires a DoD Component corporate perspective, the affordability assessment 
should not be prepared by the program manager nor should it rely too heavily on the user. It requires a 
higher-level perspective capable of balancing budget trade-offs (affordability) across a set of users (2006, 
July 7, Section 3.2.2). 
6 A first step in the program’s affordability assessment is to portray the projected annual modernization 
funding (RDT&E plus procurement, measured as TOA) in constant dollars for the six-year programming 
period and for twelve years beyond. Similar funding streams for other acquisition programs in the same 
mission area also would be included. What remains to be determined is whether this projected funding 
growth is realistically affordable relative to the DoD Component’s most likely overall funding. The model in 
this study proposes structuring the Economic Evaluation of Alternatives not only for a most likely budget 
but also for an optimistic and pessimistic budget. 
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funding demands will be accommodated by reductions in other mission areas, or in other 
accounts.8 This Opportunity Cost Approach is the last of six ways proposed in this study to 
structure an Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA). 
Nesting the Requirements Generation and Defense Acquisition Systems within PPBE 
suggests formulating the military’s acquisition problem in terms of identifying and funding 
specific defense investments that maximize value (performance or effectiveness) for a given 
budget. If AoAs were framed as a constrained optimization—i.e., maximizing performance 
subject to a budget constraint (or alternatively minimizing costs subject to a given level of 
performance)—they could be used to support resource-allocation decisions in the Programming 
phase of PPBE.9 These dual constrained-optimization approaches represent the first two of six 
ways proposed in this study to structure an Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA). 
Unfortunately, MCDM techniques typically applied to structure an AoA do not easily lend 
themselves to this interpretation. As a consequence, instead of being constrained by budgets, 
budgets are more often the output of an AoA, generating and/or supporting so-called “funding 
requirements.”  Our third approach to structuring an Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA) 
turns this on its head. 
Instead of generating a budget through the AoA process, we propose that decision-
makers or analysts forecast an optimistic, pessimistic, and most likely budget as part of the 
PPBE process, and then approach vendors to generate alternatives that fit within that budget 
envelope.10 This offers an alternate approach to defense investment decisions based on explicit 
funding (resource/budget/affordability) scenarios. This also supports the “long-standing DoD 
policy to seek full funding of acquisition programs, based on the most likely cost” (DoD, 2006, 
July 7, Chapter 3.23). 
The primary goal of this study is to improve defense decisions by bringing the taxpayer 
up-front alongside the warfighter in the defense acquisition process. This is accomplished by 
explicitly introducing an affordability assessment in EEoA through optimistic, pessimistic, and 
most likely funding scenarios. Unlike traditional MCDM approaches to AoAs that focus on cost 
and operational effectiveness, an EEoA adds a third dimension. It makes a clear distinction 
                                                
8 Note that in the “off-year” of the biennial PPBE process, DoD Components are restricted to the second 
year of the biennial budget and are required to submit Program Change Proposals (PCPs) and/or Budget 
Change Proposals (BCPs) to account for any program-cost increases, schedule delays, etc. PCPs 
address issues over a multi-year period, whereas BCPs address issues focused on the upcoming budget 
year. Moreover, to stay within fiscal constraints, BCPs and PCPs must identify resource reductions in 
other programs to offset any cost growth. This is similar in spirit to the “opportunity cost” approach that we 
propose as one of six ways to structure an EEoA. 
9 Translating the budget implications of these decisions into the usual Congressional appropriation 
categories (Military Personnel, Procurement, Operations & Maintenance (O&M), Military Construction, 
etc.) generates the defense budget and Future Year Defense Program (FYDP). 
10 This is in the spirit of the Department of the Army’s Acquisition Procedures, which explicitly state that 
“Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) applies to all defense acquisition programs [….and] treats cost 
as an input to, rather than an output of, the materiel requirements and acquisition processes.” The Army 
guidance emphasizes “CAIV is focused on […] meeting operational requirements with a solution that is 
affordable […and that does] not exceed cost constraints [and to] establish CAIV-based cost objectives 
(development, procurement, and sustainment costs) early in the acquisition process.”  Moreover, the 
“RFP must […] solicit from potential suppliers an approach […] for meeting CAIV objectives” (DoA, 1999, 
July 15, p. 63). 
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between the “lifecycle cost” or “price” of an alternative, its operational effectiveness, and 
“funding” (budget or resources) available. 
The EEoA approach responds to two fundamental challenges highlighted by the GAO 
that continue to face the DoD’s Defense Acquisition System: “(1) [to make] better decisions 
about which programs should be pursued or not pursued given existing and expected funding; 
[and] (2) [to develop] an analytical approach to better prioritize capability needs” (GAO, 2009, 
March 18, Highlights).  
In stressing affordability, EEoA offers an analytical approach that begins to resolve a 
major concern expressed by the GAO:  
DoD’s processes for identifying war-fighter needs [JCIDS], allocating resources [PPBE], 
and developing and procuring weapon systems [DAS…] are fragmented […so that] DoD 
commits to more programs than resources [budgets] can support […]. DoD allows 
programs to begin development without a full understanding [of] the resources 
[budget/funding] needed.11 (2009, March 18, Highlights)  
Whereas funding decisions for major programs take place through the PPBE process, 
the GAO finds that: 
[T]he process does not produce an accurate picture of the department’s resource needs 
[funding/budget requirements] for weapon system programs [...]. Ultimately, the process 
produces more demand for new weapon system programs than available resources can 
support.12 (2009, March 18, p. 6)  
The EEoA approach proposed in this study represents an important step in integrating 
the DoD’s requirements generation and Defense Acquisition Systems with PPBE. For instance, 
in considering alternative budget scenarios that rely on the FYDP, it injects an explicit 
constrained-optimization approach into the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) that parallels the 
one already embedded in the PPBE process.13  
In generating alternatives under optimistic, pessimistic and most likely budget scenarios, 
the EEoA requires explicit interaction with the PPBE process. In sharp contrast with the MCDM 
approach that underlies most AoAs, the EEoA approaches explicitly identify and emphasize 
budgets, funding, and affordability. Ultimately, widespread adoption of the EEoA would 
contribute to the goal of:  
greater consultation between requirements, budget, and acquisition processes [that] 
could help improve the department’s […] portfolio of weapon programs […]. This means 
that decision makers responsible for weapon system requirements, funding, and 
                                                
11 “The lack of early systems engineering, acceptance of unreliable cost estimates based on overly 
optimistic assumptions, failure to commit full funding, and the addition of new requirements well into the 
acquisition cycle all contribute to poor outcomes” (GAO, 2009, March 18). Whereas this study focuses on 
funding risks, Melese, Franck, Angelis and Dillard (2007, January) introduce an economic approach 
called “Transaction Cost Analysis” that addresses the other GAO concerns. 
12 The cost of many programs reviewed by the GAO exceeded planned funding/budget levels (GAO, 
2008, July 2). 
13 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-11 titled Preparation and Submission of Budget 
Estimates is the official guidance on the preparation and submission of budget estimates to Congress. 
The Army’s Acquisition guidance emphasizes “the requirement for presenting the full funding for an 
acquisition program—that is the total cost [for] a given system as reflected in the most recent FYDP […] 
pertains to all acquisition programs” (DoA, 1999, July 15, p. 41). 
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acquisition execution must establish an investment strategy in concert […], assuring 
requirements for specific weapon systems are clearly defined and achievable given 
available resources [funding/budgets]. (GAO, 2008, July 2, p.10, 14) 
The next section offers a brief description and critical evaluation of the status quo. We 
review two common decision criteria used in cost-effectiveness analyses. The first is the popular 
“bang-for-the-buck” or Benefit/Cost ratio. The second criterion is essentially a weighted average 
of cost and effectiveness, a decision rule generated by the standard static, deterministic MCDM 
approach to cost-effectiveness analysis that underpins most contemporary AoAs. 
Section 3 offers a set of alternate approaches to resolve the decision-criterion problem. 
Six intuitive approaches are described to structure an Economic Evaluation of Alternatives 
(EEoA).14 Section 4 concludes with a Decision Map to guide analysts and decision-makers in 
selecting which of the six approaches is best suited for them to structure an Economic 
Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA). 
A Critical Evaluation of the Status Quo: Two Popular Decision 
Criteria 
Today, most modern military investment (and disinvestment) decisions are supported by 
some form of cost-benefit analysis (CBA). The US Department of Defense (DoD) applies CBA 
to anything from milestone decisions for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs and 
MAISs), to outsourcing (OMB Circular A-76; Eger & Wilsker, 2007), to public-private 
partnerships, to privatization, to Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) actions (see OMB 
Circular A-94; FAR; DFARS; DoD 5000 series, etc.). 
When benefits cannot be expressed in monetary terms, analysts develop so-called 
“measures of effectiveness” (MOEs), in which case CBA is generally referred to as “cost-
effectiveness” analysis (OMB, 1992, October 29).15  The most common methodology and 
approach for building MOEs and structuring cost-effectiveness analyses is alternately referred 
to as Multiple-criteria Decision-making (MCDM), Multi-attribute Utility Theory (MAUT), or 
Multiple-objective Decision-making (MODM) (see French, 1986; Keeney & Raiffa, 1976; 
Clemen, 1996; Kirkwood, 1997; Parnell, 2006; Ramesh & Zionts, 1997; etc.). 
This study describes some limitations of the current decision criteria methodology and 
proposes an alternate methodology derived explicitly from a constrained-optimization approach, 
closer in spirit to the economic origins of cost-effectiveness analysis in Gorman (1980); Hitch 
and McKean (1967); Michael and Becker (1973); Stigler (1945); Theil (1952); etc.—although 
often attributed to Lancaster (1969a; 1969b; 1971; 1979). The six approaches we offer to 
structure an Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA) resolves the decision-criterion 
                                                
14 Appendix 3 (in the Mathematical Appendix—available upon request) reveals the static, deterministic, 
multi-stage, constrained-optimization, micro-economic production (procurement auction) model that 
underpins the central EEoA approach. 
15 Fisher (1965) argues that “numerous terms […] convey the same general meaning […] ‘cost-benefit 
analysis,’ ‘cost-effectiveness analysis,’ ‘systems analysis,’ ‘operations analysis,’ etc. Because of such 
terminological confusion, […] all of these terms are rejected and ‘cost-utility analysis’ is employed instead” 
(p. 185). Although this study uses the terms “cost-benefit” and “cost-effectiveness” interchangeably, the 
assumption throughout is that neither “benefits” nor “effectiveness” can be measured in monetary terms. 
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problem. A key difference between the MCDM approach to an AoA and the Economic 
Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA) is that instead of modeling decision alternatives from 
competing vendors as points in cost-effectiveness space, the EEoA models the alternatives as 
functions of optimistic, pessimistic, and most likely funding (resource/budget) scenarios.  
The EEoA approach directly responds to the GAO’s observation that affordability needs 
to be an integral part of any business case analysis of alternatives: “[o]ur work in [uncovering] 
best practices has found that an executable business case [requires] demonstrated evidence 
that […] the chosen concept can be developed and produced within existing resources 
[funding/budgets]” (GAO, 2008, p. 6). Benchmarking against the private sector, the GAO 
emphasizes that “successful commercial enterprises […] follow a disciplined integrated process 
during which the pros and cons of competing proposals are assessed based on strategic 
objectives […] and available resources [budgets/funding]” (GAO, 2009, March 18, p. 5, 
emphasis added).  
A distinctive feature of defense investment decisions is that multiple criteria such as cost 
and effectiveness cannot easily be combined into a single, overall objective such as 
“government profitability.” The problem of ranking public investments when benefits cannot be 
expressed in dollars has spawned an extensive literature in management science, operations 
research and the decision sciences. 
This literature models investment alternatives as bundles of measurable characteristics 
(attributes or criteria). Techniques that mostly fall under the umbrella of MCDM are routinely 
used by analysts and decision-makers (for example, through AoAs) to guide public investment 
decisions. The development of “Measures of Effectiveness” (MOE’s)16 and lifecycle cost 
calculations are used to help rank alternatives. An ongoing concern is how to integrate costs 
and effectiveness in the final selection process (see Henry & Hogan, 1993; Melese & Bonsper, 
1996, December; Melese, Stroup, & Lowe, 1997; etc.). 
In their pioneering work applying economic analysis to defense, Hitch and McKean 
(1967) define a “criterion” as the “test by which we choose one alternative […] rather than 
another” (p. 160). They stress that “[t]he choice of an appropriate economic criterion is […] the 
central problem in designing a [cost-effectiveness] analysis” (p. 160). 
The two most popular decision criteria used to integrate cost and effectiveness in AoAs 
are: 1) to construct Benefit/Cost (or MOE/Cost) ratios, and 2) to assign a weight on cost relative 
to effectiveness and construct a weighted average of cost and effectiveness (often using a 
linear, separable, additive “value” function). The latter decision criterion is a common 
prescription for AoAs that emerges from MCDM. Both approaches, however, are problematic.  
We first focus on what is arguably the most commonly applied criterion—Benefit/Cost 
ratios. Then, we move to the most common MCDM decision criterion—to assign a relative 
weight to the cost (price) of alternatives in an overall value function. At first glance, the 
Benefit/Cost (MOE/Cost) ratio or “bang-for-the-buck” criterion is appealing. However, it turns out 
                                                
16 The Defense Acquisition Guidebook, Section 3.3.1: AoA Plan, states that “measures of effectiveness 
[…] provide the details that allow the proficiency of each alternative in performing the mission tasks to be 
quantified […]. A measure of performance typically is a quantitative measure of a system characteristic 
(e.g., range, […] logistics footprint, etc.) chosen to enable calculation of one or more measures of 
effectiveness” (DoD, 2006, July 7). 
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to be largely meaningless unless alternatives are constructed for a specific budget scenario or 
to achieve a specific level of effectiveness. Meanwhile, the second decision criterion can also be 
misleading in the absence of a specific budget scenario (and a good understanding of 
“opportunity costs”).17  
“Bang-for-the-Buck” (Benefit/Cost or MOE/Cost) Ratios 
It is relatively well known that a Benefit/Cost ratio (or “bang-for-the-buck”) decision criterion 
is largely meaningless unless alternatives are constructed for a specific budget scenario or to 
achieve a specific level of effectiveness. Yet, the next four examples illustrate that this remains 
a popular decision criterion, even when alternatives differ in both costs and effectiveness.  
1. In a military text entitled Executive Decision Making, the author offers that “[w]hen we 
cannot fix cost or effectiveness, we might combine them to help us choose between 
alternatives […]. If neither can be fixed […] we can establish a cost/effectiveness 
ratio” (Murray, 2002, pp. 6-3, 6-10). 
2. The Department of the Army’s Economic Analysis Manual, in a section entitled 
Comparing Costs and Benefits, states: “When the results yield unequal cost and 
unequal benefits […] in this situation all alternatives […] may be ranked in 
decreasing order of their benefit/cost ratios” (DoA, 2001, February, p. 32).  
3. Finally, in a recent landmark RAND study on Capabilities-based Planning, the author 
falls into the same trap. In a section entitled Choosing Among Options in a Portfolio, 
Paul Davis (2002) develops “A Notional Scorecard for Assessing Alternatives in a 
Portfolio Framework,” where alternatives differ in both their costs and effectiveness. 
Nevertheless, the decision criterion recommended by the author to select among 
alternative options in “[t]he last column is the ratio of effectiveness over cost” (pp. 45-
46). 
 
Each of these diverse examples recommends using a Benefit/Cost ratio as the decision 
criterion. However, another RAND analyst, Gene Fisher (1971), clearly points out in his classic 
text Cost Considerations in Systems Analysis:  
The use of ratios usually poses no problem as long as the analysis is conducted in [a] 
framework […] with the level of effectiveness or cost fixed. However, it is common to 
encounter studies where this has not been done, with the result that the comparisons 
[are] essentially meaningless. (p. 11) 
                                                
17 Ironically, given a budget scenario, there is no need to take the MCDM approach that underpins most 
AoAs since it is possible to adopt the EEoA approach—which constructs alternatives to fit within a budget 
envelope, converting the problem into a straightforward MOE maximization. 
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Benefit/Cost (A1)  > Benefit/Cost (A2)
Is A1 really superior to A2 ?
LESSON: DANGER in using Benefit/Cost (Bang/Buck) or 
Cost/Benefit (Buck/Bang) ratios without anchoring Budget or MOE
Marginal Benefit/Marginal Cost
“The perceived benefits of the 
higher priced proposal shall 
merit the additional cost…”  
www.arnet.gov FAR 15.101-1(2)c
 
Figure 1. Inappropriate Application of Benefit/Cost Ratios 
A simple, extreme example helps illustrate the danger in using Benefit/Cost ratios 
without anchoring the Budget, or a specified Measure of Effectiveness (MOE). Suppose 
Alternative A1 in Figure 1 costs $10 million and yields an MOE of 10 utils, while Alternative A2 
costs $1 billion and yields an MOE of 900 utils.18 Applying the Benefit/Cost ratio criterion 
indicates that A1 has a bigger “bang-for-the-buck” since it returns 1 util per million dollars, while 
A2 only offers 0.9 utils per million dollars. Strictly using Benefit/Cost ratios to rank alternatives is 
dangerous in this case since it ignores the absolute magnitude of the costs involved. Suppose 
the situation was reversed and A2 offered a higher Benefit/Cost ratio than A1. Anyone that 
chooses A2 strictly on the basis of “bang-for-the-buck” would be in for an unpleasant surprise (a 
1-billion vs. 10-million-dollar decision). 
Since affordability and opportunity costs are always a concern in public investment 
decisions (especially those made through the PPBE process, requirements generation system, 
and Defense Acquisition System), it is imperative that analysts and decision-makers explore the 
budget and opportunity cost implications of going with the high-cost alternative (for example, the 
extra expenditure of $990 million for an additional 890 utils of MOE) or, equivalently, of the 
savings in going with the low-cost alternative.  
In applying economic analysis to defense, Hitch and McKean (1967) warn: 
One common “compromise criteria” is to pick that [alternative] which has the highest 
ratio of effectiveness to cost. [M]aximizing this ration is the [decision] criterion. [While] it 
may be a plausible criterion at first glance […] it allows the absolute magnitude of 
                                                
18 In Figure 1, the slope of any ray from the origin represents a constant Benefit/Cost ratio anywhere 
along that ray. The steeper the slope, the greater the Benefit/Cost ratio. 
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[effectiveness] or cost to roam at will. In fact, the only way to know what such a ratio 
really means is to tighten the constraint until either a single budget (or particular degree 
of effectiveness) is specified. And at that juncture, the ratio reduces itself to the test of 
maximum effectiveness for a given budget (or a specified effectiveness at minimum 
cost), and might better have been put that way at the outset […]. The test of maximum 
effectiveness for a given budget (or alternatively, minimum cost of achieving a specified 
level of effectiveness) […] seems much less likely to mislead the unwary.19 (pp. 165-167) 
Our Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA) approach follows this and another of 
Hitch and McKean’s (1967) recommendations. “As a starter […] several budget sizes can be 
assumed. If the same [alternative] is preferred for all […] budgets, that system is dominant […]. 
If the same [alternative] is not dominant the use of several […] budgets is nevertheless an 
essential step, because it provides vital information to the decision maker” (p. 176). 
We conclude that the use of Benefit/Cost ratios as a decision criterion poses no problem 
as long as the analysis is structured with the level of either utility (MOE) or budget/funding 
fixed.20 Since Benefit/Cost ratios are “misleading”21 in any context in which alternatives differ in 
both costs (price) and benefits (MOE), decision scientists have developed another decision 
criterion to rank investment options in AoAs. This second popular decision criterion is examined 
below. 
Weighted Averages of Cost and Effectiveness: Assigning a Weight to Cost 
MCDM is often used as an umbrella term, and we will do so here. “In the literature the 
terms multi-attribute decision making (MADM), multi-criteria decision making (MCDM), and 
multi-objective decision making (MODM) are used almost interchangeably” (French, 1986, p. 
105). In a typical MCDM evaluation, a decision-maker (DM) is asked to identify desired 
attributes (criteria/characteristics) of a project, program or system to fill some critical capability 
gap, given a specific threat scenario. Next, the DM is asked to reveal agreeable trade-offs 
among those attributes. An exercise of this sort helps analysts uncover the DM’s underlying 
trade-offs or “utility” function, used to generate a Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) for each 
alternative.22  
                                                
19 The authors continue: “Of course, if the ratios did not alter with changes in the scale of achievement (or 
cost, the higher ratio would indicate the preferred system, no matter what the scale […]. But to assume 
that such ratios are constant is inadmissible some of the time and hazardous the rest” (Hitch & McKean, 
1967, p. 167). 
20 An additional (necessary and sufficient) condition is a linear, separable, additive objective function. 
21 “Usually, ratios are regarded as potentially misleading because they mask important information” (DoD, 
2006, July 7, Section 3.3.1). 
22 “Measures of Effectiveness […] provide the details that allow the proficiency of each alternative in 
performing the mission tasks to be quantified […]. A measure of performance typically is a quantitative 
measure of a system characteristic (e.g., range, etc.) chosen to enable calculation of one or more 
measures of effectiveness […]. The cost analysis normally is performed in parallel with the operational 
effectiveness analysis. It is equal in importance in the overall AoA process […]. [I]ts results are later 
combined with the operational effectiveness analysis to portray cost-effectiveness comparisons” (DoD, 
2006, July 7, Section 3.3.1). 
 =
=
==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå======== - 17 - 
=
=
In attempting to understand a DM’s utility function, decision scientists beginning with 
Saaty (1977) bridged an important implementation gap. Objectives (analytic) hierarchy 
approaches were developed that help reveal underlying utility functions. For example, an 
objectives hierarchy can help a DM work down from a high-level objective (provide national 
security) to a relevant set of sub-objectives (an effective airlift capability), to specific attributes 
(mobility, transportability, etc.), and, finally, to measurable characteristics (mobility=speed (S), 
range (R); transportability=payload (P), weight (W), etc.).  
The outcome in this example is a utility function for airlift capability: U=U(M(S,R); 
T(P,W)), where the characteristics might be measured respectively in mph, miles, cubic feet, 
and pounds. The standard assumption in the literature is to define a linear, separable additive 
utility function that generates an MOE for each alternative that is roughly analogous to a 
weighted average of its attributes (provided certain assumptions are satisfied such as “additive 
independence,” etc. (see French, 1986; Keeney & Raiffa, 1976; Keeney, 1994). There is a vast 
literature concerned with eliciting preference weights and the normalization of characteristics 
data that involves several important issues discussed in the Mathematical Appendix (available 
upon request).  
Temporarily overlooking these issues, it is interesting to note in passing that maximizing 
a linear multi-attribute utility function subject to a budget constraint yields a decision rule 
analogous to the Benefit/Cost ratio criterion discussed above. Under the assumption of a fixed 
budget and linear additive separable utility function, the Benefit/Cost decision rule can be used 
to evaluate alternatives. In this case, the winning alternative is the one that generates the 
highest MOE per dollar or the biggest “bang-for-the-buck.” With a more general (non-linear) 
utility function, the equivalent optimization generates a more complex Marginal Benefit/Marginal 
Cost decision rule. 
In reality, the MCDM techniques that underpin most AoAs often do not rely on an explicit 
discussion of the budget (affordability/funding/resources) to structure the decision problem. As a 
consequence, the problem is generally not structured as a constrained optimization, as 
described above. 
Instead, a popular decision-analysis approach is to simply attach a weight to cost and 
introduce it directly into the utility function.23 This common practice generates an overall “value” 
function that is essentially a weighted average of cost and effectiveness. The solution is found 
through an unconstrained optimization by selecting the alternative that maximizes the “overall 
effectiveness” or “value” function V=V(MOE; COST). “Deterministic decision analysis is 
concerned with finding the most preferred alternative in decision space by constructing a value 
function representing a decision maker’s preference structure, and then using the value function 
to identify the most preferred solution” (Ramesh & Zionts, 1997, p. 421). 
                                                
23 “In the European Union, a legislative package intended to simplify and modernize existing public 
procurement laws was recently adopted. As before, the new law allows for two different award criteria: 
lowest cost and best economic value. The new provisions require that the procurement authority 
publishes ex-ante the relative weighting of each criteria used  when best economic value is the basis for 
the award” (see European Commission, 2004a; 2004b).  
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The linear, additive separable version of this value function is often used to calculate a 
positively weighted MOE and negatively weighted cost for each alternative. For example, see 
Beil & Wein (2003), Che (1993), Clemen (1996), Kirkwood (1997), French (1986), Keeney & 
Raiffa (1976), Keeney (1994), Hwang and Yoon (1981), Liberatore (1987), Pinker, Samuel, and 
Batcher (1995), Varzsonyi (1995), etc. According to the Defense Acquisition Guidebook: “An 
AoA is an analytical comparison of the operational effectiveness, suitability, and life-cycle cost 
of alternatives that satisfy established capability needs.” (DoD, 2006, July 7, Chapter 3.3) 
The typical decision sciences’ approach to an AoA can be described as: 
Given several Alternatives, select the preferred alternative that provides the Best Value, 
or Maximizes: V(MOE,COST) = w1*MOE - w2*COST 
This requires two important modeling efforts: 1) MOE—Building an Effectiveness model 
(non-cost factors; performance=quality, schedule, etc.); and 2) COST—Building a Cost model 
(costs/prices; estimate total system lifecycle costs, total ownership costs). Once the 
independent modeling efforts are completed, the overwhelming challenge is to assign a relative 
weight to cost (w2 in the example above). A typical response in the applied literature is to ask 
the DM: “How important is cost relative to effectiveness?” 
A key proponent of this decision methodology offers an example of administrators and 
regulators asking questions such as: “Which is more important, costs or pollutant 
concentrations?” (Keeney, 1994, p. 797). As the author is quick to point out, the problem with 
this approach is that without some estimate of the total budget available or any knowledge of 
opportunity costs of funds, one cannot expect the DM to provide a sensible answer. In fact, the 
author warns: “I personally do not want some administrator to give two minutes of thought to the 
matter and state that pollutant concentrations are three times as important as cost” 24 (Keeney, 
1994, p. 797). The Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) both promote similar approaches:25  
 “The solicitation shall state whether all evaluation factors other than cost/price, when 
combined [i.e., MOE], are significantly more important than, approximately equal to, 
or significantly less important than cost/price” (General Services Administration, 
2005, March, Section 15.101-1(2)). 
  “The specific weight given to cost or price shall be at least equal to all other 
evaluation factors combined unless quantifiable performance measures can be used 
to assess value and can be independently evaluated” (OMB, 2003, p. B-8). 
Consider an extreme case. If we suppose that affordability is not an issue, then funding 
is not an issue and the budget is not binding, making costs irrelevant. In this case, a zero weight 
                                                
24 Surprisingly, the author has continued to write prolifically in this field and continued to promote this 
decision criterion, apparently never taking the time to reflect back on these key observations. 
25 According to the FAR, “source selection” is the decision process used in competitive, negotiated 
contracting to select the proposal that offers the “Best Value” to the government. “In different types of 
acquisition, the relative importance of cost or price may vary” (General Services Administration, 2005, 
Section 15.101). In describing some lessons learned, Gansler (2003) recommend: Use performance-
based contracting; Do not list tasks [mix of inputs], instead state results sought or problems to be solved 
[desired attributes/characteristics of outputs/outcomes]; Choose contractors according to “Best Value”; in 
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should be assigned to costs and the analysis of alternatives can be made exclusively on the 
basis of MOEs.  
Thus, any weight applied to costs must reflect an implicit concern about affordability 
(budgets/funding levels). Figures 2 and 3 offer an illustration. Figure 2 reflects a situation in 
which the decision-maker believes costs to be important enough (and thus assigns a sufficiently 
large relative weight, w2, to cost) that the preferred alternative is A1 (the low-cost option). The 
opposite case is illustrated in Figure 3.26 How does a decision-maker (DM) decide on 
appropriate weights to assign to MOE and costs? A key hypothesis in the EEoA is that if a DM 
pays any attention to costs (i.e., places any weight on cost) it is because there is a (implicit) 
budget constraint or opportunity cost of funds for the program. This is directly related to our 
higher-level affordability discussions in Section 1 that involved requirements generation 
(JCIDS), the Defense Acquisition System (DAS), and PPBE.27  
The irony, as Keeney (1994) rightly observed, is that to assign any weight to costs 
requires the DM to have some understanding of the budget (funding/resources) available and 
an appreciation of relevant opportunity costs. But if this information is known, then the DM has 
no reason to take the MCDM approach and assign a weight on costs since the more robust, 
constrained-optimization (mathematical programming) EEoA approach becomes available. 
In fact, it is relatively straightforward to demonstrate that even if the DM had perfect 
information about the budget (funding/affordability) and attempted to interpret that information 
through a weight assigned to the cost (price) of alternatives (as illustrated in Figures 2 and 3), 
the rankings that result would only coincidentally correspond to rankings obtained under the full 
information, constrained-optimization EEoA (in which an MOE utility function is maximized 
subject to the budget constraint).28 
This is a damning result that clearly undermines the way MCDM is typically applied to 
support AoAs. If there is no guarantee this MCDM approach will yield consistent results under 
full information, then using this criterion with less than perfect information (i.e., without explicit 
assumptions about affordability/budgets/funding), is clearly problematic. In fact GAO 
emphasizes “[w]ith high levels of uncertainty […] funding needs are often understated” (GAO, 
2008, September 25, p. 9). 
                                                
26 Note that the slope of the straight-line indifference curves that reflect the DM’s relative preference (or 
trade-offs) between MOE and Cost are given by –w2/w1. 
27 In fact, the Army’s Economic Analysis (EA) Manual states that “[a] good EA should go beyond the 
decision-making process and become an integral part of developing requirements in the PPBE process” 
(DoA, 2001, February, p. 12). 
28 The weight on cost in the unconstrained-optimization (MCDM) approach roughly corresponds to the 
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Figure 3. When Effectiveness is Relatively More Important than Cost 
 
In conclusion, the popular MCDM, Decision Sciences approach that underpins many 
AoAs implicitly attempts to capture affordability through a relative weight assigned to cost in a 
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value function such as, Maximize V = V(MOE,Cost) = w1*MOE - w2*Cost. 29 Again, to quote 
Hitch and McKean (1967):  
One ubiquitous source of confusion is the attempt to maximize gain [w1*MOE] while 
minimizing cost [w2*Cost] […] If a person approaches a problem with the intention of 
using such a [decision] criterion, he is confused to begin with […] [A] criterion in which 
the budget […] is specified has the virtue of being aboveboard. (pp.165-167)  
A very real risk in this MCDM approach is that if AoAs “fail to balance needs with 
resources [funding/budgets], […] un-executable programs [are allowed] to move forward, [and] 
program managers […] are handed […] a low probability of success” (GAO, 2009, p. 10). Rather 
than attempt to get a DM to reveal their affordability concerns through a weight assigned to 
costs (or prices) of alternatives, the EEoA recommends a more transparent and accountable 
approach—to treat “cost as an independent variable” (CAIV).  
The CAIV concept adopted here follows a definition posted on the OUSD (A&T) website 
in early 1999 that CAIV is the “DoD’s acquisition methodology of making technical and schedule 
performance a function of available budgeted resources” (see Lorell & Graser, 2001, p. 33). 
OMB Circular A-109 for Major Systems Acquisition mentions the goal of “design-to-cost”: “Under 
the CAIV philosophy, performance and schedule are considered dependent on the funds 
available for a specific program” (OMB, 1976). According to the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 
“all participants […] are expected to recognize the reality of fiscal constraints” (DoD, 2006, July 
7, Section 3.2.4). 
Six Ways to Structure an “Economic Evaluation of Alternatives” 
(EEoA) 
We have identified (what we believe are the only) six ways that analysts and decision-
makers can structure a deterministic Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA) that avoid the 
issues (decision-criteria problems) discussed in the last section. These involve two main 
categories of approaches: 1) Intra-program analysis and 2) Inter-program analysis. The first, 
third, and fourth approaches are very much in the spirit of “cost as an independent variable” 
(CAIV). By recalling the earlier quote from Hitch and McKean (1967), we are reminded of the 
first two EEoA approaches: “[A] criterion in which the budget or level of effectiveness specified 





                                                
29 In a section describing “Building a Model,” Fisher (1965) comments: “Since by definition a model is an 
abstraction from reality, the model must be built on a set of assumptions. These assumptions must be 
made explicit. If they are not, this is to be regarded as a defect of the model design” (p. 190). It is easy to 
conceal the importance of affordability (budget/funding) issues in the MCDM, Decision Sciences 
approach that underpins many AoAs. In sharp contrast, the Economic Evaluation of Alternatives 
approach encourages explicit affordability (budget/funding) assumptions.  
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Table 1. Six Approaches to Structure an EEoA 
 
In the case of Intra-program analysis, the decision-maker (DM) associated with the 
program is assumed to have sufficient information to be able to select an alternative without 
reference to competing programs. That is not the case in Inter-program analysis, which requires 
an explicit “opportunity cost approach.”  
There are two possibilities highlighted within the Intra-program analysis approach. The 
first possibility is when DMs (analysts) are able to construct/define/build alternatives 
(“endogenous alternatives”). The second possibility is when the alternatives are already 
constructed/defined/built and must simply be evaluated (“exogenous alternatives”).  
This section describes each of the six Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA) 
approaches in some detail. The Mathematical Appendix describes the static, deterministic, 
multi-stage, constrained-optimization, micro-economic production (procurement auction) model 
that underpins the third, and most general, approach to the EEoA, the Expansion Path 
Approach. We begin with the Fixed Budget Approach, based on the earlier quote from Hitch and 
McKean (1967): “The test of maximum effectiveness for a given budget seems much less likely 
to mislead the unwary” (p. 167, emphasis added).  
1. Fixed Budget Approach 
In his groundbreaking book Cost Considerations in Systems Analysis, Fisher (1971) 
states: “In the fixed budget case, the alternatives being considered are compared on the basis 
of effectiveness likely to be attainable for the specified budget level” (p. 12). In other words, 
Fisher also explains that, “The analysis attempts to determine that alternative (or feasible 
combination […]) which is likely to produce the highest effectiveness” (p. 10). 
In a footnote, Fisher (1971) adds: “the fixed budget situation is somewhat analogous to 
the economic theory of consumer [optimization…]. For a given level of income [budget] the 
consumer is assumed to behave in such a way that he maximizes his utility” (p. 10). Drawing on 
this comparison, the Fixed Budget Approach to the EEoA leverages Lancaster’s “characteristics 
approach to demand theory” (Lancaster, 1969a; 1969b; 1971; 1979). Originating in the works of 
Gorman (1980), Stigler (1945), Theil (1952), and others (that also provided an early foundation 
for some of the MCDM literature), Lancaster offers economists (and defense analysts) a familiar 
way to analyze the consumer (or defense DM’s) choice problem (such as choosing among 
defense investment alternatives).  
I) INTRA-PROGRAM ANALYSIS 
A) Build Alternatives 
1. Fixed Budget Approach 
2. Fixed Effectiveness Approach  
3. Expansion Path Approach (Construct alternatives as Cost-
output/Effectiveness Relations or “Response Functions”: Multi-stage Micro-
economic Production Model) 
B) Modify Existing Alternatives: “Level the Playing Field”  
4. Modified Budget Approach: GOTO 1.  
5. Modified Effectiveness Approach: GOTO 2.  
II) INTER-PROGRAM ANALYSIS 
6. Opportunity Cost/Benefit Approach 
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In Lancaster’s model, different vendors generate different bundles of characteristics 
evaluated by decision-makers (“consumers”). Lancaster’s model proposes that to choose 
among alternative bundles of commodities (say computers), defense decision-makers maximize 
their utility function, defined over a desired set of criteria, attributes, or characteristics—hence 
the term adopted by decision scientists, Multiple-criteria Decision-making (MCDM)—subject to a 
budget [funding/affordability] constraint, which is mostly not adopted by decision scientists.30 In 
this approach, the cost-effective alternative is the one that, for a given budget or expenditure, 
generates the best mix of characteristics, evaluated using the decision-maker’s utility function.  
Cost-Effectiveness EEoA
Build Alternatives
1. Fixed Budget Approach
Maximize Effectiveness subject to Budget Constraint















Outsourcing Opportunity:    




Figure 4. Fixed Budget Approach  
 
This Fixed Budget Approach is the first of six ways proposed to structure an Economic 
Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA) and is illustrated in Figure 4.31 The Budget estimate for the 
program in Figure 4 is set at level B*. The three alternatives constructed given this budget are 
A1, A2, and A3. Given its superior performance in terms of its MOE, A3 wins the competition, 
which, in this case, can also be determined from its Benefit/Cost ratio.  
2. Fixed Effectiveness Approach 
                                                
30 Note that we refer to the usual deterministic “utility function” that is conventional in the economics 
literature. This is in contrast to the way a utility function is typically defined in the decision sciences and 
operations management literature as a stochastic function. The “value function” described in the latter 
literature is similar to our “utility function,” except that costs can enter into a value function and are 
excluded from our utility function since they appear as part of the budget constraint. 
31 Note that in the first and second EEoA approaches, since either the budget (funding level) or MOE 
(level of effectiveness) is anchored in the constrained optimization, the Benefit/Cost ratio decision 
criterion can be used as a decision rule in the selection process. The steeper the slope from the origin 
through an alternative (A1, A2, A3), the bigger the “bang-for-the-buck.” 
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The second way to structure an EEoA is the dual of the first: minimize the cost of 
achieving a given MOE. RAND Corporation’s AoA for the KC-135 Recapitalization adopts this 
approach, stating: “in this AoA, the most ‘cost-effective’ alternative [fleet] means precisely the 
alternative whose effectiveness meets the aerial refueling requirement at the lowest cost” 
(Kennedy et al., 2006, p. 7, emphasis added). Figure 5 offers an illustration. 
Another example is the section on cost-effectiveness analysis in OMB Circular A-94 that 
states: “A program is cost-effective if, on the basis of life cycle cost analysis of competing 
alternatives, it is determined to have the lowest costs […] for a given amount of benefits […]. 
Cost-effectiveness analysis can also be used to compare programs with identical costs 
[budgets/funding] but differing benefits” (OMB, 1992, October 29, p. 4). The latter part of the 




2. Fixed Effectiveness Approach
Dual: Minimize Costs subject to Effectiveness Constraint












= MOE*/$B1 Outsourcing Opportunity:   
Can we spend less bucks for 
the same bang?              OMB 
Circular A-76: Statement of 
Work(SOW); Invitation for Bid(IFB) 
If A1 is the In-house MEO, then 
“Outsourcing’s Out & Insourcing’s In” 
(DoD FY 2005 : 71% A-76 won by in-house MEO)
 
 
Figure 5. Fixed Effectiveness Approach 
 
Another example of the Fixed Effectiveness Approach to structuring an EEoA is given by 
public-private (competitive sourcing) competitions conducted under OMB Circular A-76, which 
“requires […] a structured process for [evaluating] the most efficient and cost-effective method 
of performance for commercial activities” (2003, May 29). This involves four steps: 1) develop a 
Statement of Work (SOW) or Performance Work Statement (PWS) to define desired 
performance/effectiveness, 2) construct the Most Efficient Organization (MEO) for the in-house 
competitor, 3) issue an Invitation for Bid (IFB) for well-defined, routine commercial activities 
(SOW or PWS), and 4) compare bids or proposals (source selection) and select the “least cost” 
for IFB.  
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Finally, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part IV, Chapter 146, Section 2462 of the US Code reads: “A 
function of the Department of Defense […] may not be converted […] to performance by a 
contractor unless the conversion is based on the results of a public-private competition that […] 
examines the cost of performance of the function by Department of Defense civilian employees 
and the cost of performance of the function by one or more contractors to demonstrate whether 
converting to performance by a contractor will result in savings to the Government over the life 
of the contract” (2007, January 3). This offers another example of the Fixed Effectiveness 
Approach to structuring an EEoA. 
3. Expansion Path (Response Function) Approach 
Hitch and McKean (1967) strongly hint at the third way to structure an EEoA: “The test of 
maximum effectiveness for a given budget seems much less likely to mislead the unwary” (p. 
167). They explain, “As a starter, […] several budget sizes can be assumed. If the same 
[alternative] is preferred for all […] budgets, that system is dominant. If the same [alternative] is 
not dominant, the use of several […] budgets is nevertheless an essential step, because it 
provides vital information to the decision maker” (p.176, emphasis added). 
This third way to structure an EEoA is the foundation for all the others and is 
described mathematically in the Mathematical Appendix (available upon request). It is 
modeled as a three-step process that involves multiple players.  
For ease of exposition, we assume three players: the military buyer and two 
private vendors. The first step is for the military buyer to publish a synopsis of the 
solicitation. This synopsis (solicitation) states all significant non-price factors 
(criteria/attributes/characteristics) that the agency expects to consider in evaluating 









ECONOMIC APPROACH: Endogenous Alternatives (“Engel Curves”)
A1
A2
3. Expansion Path (Response Function) Approach
(Alternatives are Cost-Effectiveness Relations, not Points)
Explore impact of budget cuts (Identify vendor responses)
Alternative 2
Alternative 1




Source Selection Decision: A2 for pessimistic budget; A1 for optimistic budget  
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Figure 6. Expansion Path Optimization Approach 
 
Assuming the award will be made without discussions (pursuant to FAR 52.212-1 and 
52.215-1 (General Services Administration, 2005)), the military buyer has a secret scoring rule32 
used to rank vendors that is only revealed after the award of the contract. Once a solicitation is 
issued in the form of an RFP or IFB, interested vendors submit their offers and the selection 
process begins.33 
Each vendor is assumed to have different production and cost functions (to generate the 
attributes). The vendors constrained optimizations define distinct expansion paths, one for each 
vendor. From the Envelope Theorem, the Lagrangian multiplier in each vendor’s optimization 
reveals the marginal product (the extra output or attribute mix possible for them to produce) 
from relaxing the funding constraint, i.e., using a more optimistic budget.  
Economic Evaluation of Alternatives Approach:  
Military Buyer Goal: Select an alternative that Maximizes  
MOE = utility function = U(non-cost factors/attributes),  
Subject to BUDGET constraint = TC 
Vendor Goal: Select a mix of non-cost factors that 
Maximizes Q = Production Function = Q(non-cost factors/attributes)   
Subject to TC = Sum of Costs of Attributes = c1 x a1 + c2 x a2 +… <= Budget 
Military Buyer: 
(MOE) build-effectiveness model (non-cost factors: Performance = quality, schedule, 
etc.)  
(COST) build-cost model (costs/prices: Estimate total system lifecycle costs, total 
ownership costs) 
(BUDGET) Estimate budget (funding level for the program) 
Private Vendor: 
(Q) Understand Production Function Generates Attributes  
(TC) Identify cost of producing each attribute 
Construct Alternatives as a function of the Military Buyer’s Budget constraint 
 
This EEoA approach illustrated in Figure 6 follows Hitch and McKean’s (1967) 
recommendations: “As a starter […] several budget sizes can be assumed. If the same 
[alternative] is preferred for all […] budgets, that system is dominant […]. If the same 
[alternative] is not dominant the use of several […] budgets is nevertheless an essential step, 
because it provides vital information to the decision maker” (p. 176). 
The expansion path for each vendor (see Mathematical Appendix) reveals what that 
vendor can offer at different budget levels (e.g., pessimistic, most likely and optimistic). The set 
of each vendor’s proposals under the different budget scenarios is an “alternative.” When the 
set of expansion path proposals of each vendor are transformed (through the government’s 
                                                
32 The buyer can request a single offer from each supplier and choose the one he prefers among the 
submitted offers. “We call this procedure a ‘single-bid auction with secret scoring rule’” (Asker & Cantillon, 
2004, p. 1). 
33 The budget announcements are analogous to an agency exploring in order to uncover its true 
“reservation price” for the acquisition (given the competing demands for scarce budgets). The adoption of 
this approach of evaluating vendor proposals under different reservation prices could eventually lead to 
greater use of fixed-price contracts.  
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utility function) into a cost-utility or cost-effectiveness (MOE) function for that particular vendor, 
then, given a range of likely budgets for the program, the most effective vendor over that range 
of budgets can be selected (see Figure 6).  
This approach explicitly addresses a key concern of the GAO that “A cost estimate is 
[…] usually presented to decision makers as a […] point estimate that is expected to represent 
the most likely cost of the program but provides no information about the range of risk and 
uncertainty or level of confidence associated with the estimate” (GAO, 2009, p. 9). The three-
stage procurement auction process is summarized in Table 2 below.  
 

























Whereas the first three ways to structure an EEoA assume that alternatives can be 
generated by the decision-maker, the last three assume that alternatives are exogenously 
determined and that the decision-maker must choose among pre-specified alternatives. The 
interesting cases are those in which an alternative costs more but offers greater utility, while 
others cost less and offer less utility. 
4. Modified Budget Approach 
Suppose that the overall budget or desired level of effectiveness for a program is not 
available and that the alternatives are derived exogenously—for example, on the basis of a 
manpower or squadron constraint (e.g., one computer per person or a certain number of aircraft 
per squadron). Then, it is likely that the pre-specified alternatives solicited from different vendors 
have different costs and yield different measures of effectiveness (MOE). The first step might be 
1) First Stage: (CAIV)  
– The DoD provides notional budget guidance (B) to alternative vendors for the 
program. The DoD searches for the optimum product (Procurement) and/or service 
(R&D; O&M) package that it can obtain at that price, B. The DoD also reveals 
optimistic and pessimistic budget guidance. 
– The DoD defines the set of characteristics/attributes that it values, and this is 
known to vendors. However, the DoD’s precise utility function over those 
characteristics is unknown to vendors (secret scoring rule). 
2) Second Stage: (Target Costing) 
– Vendors have different costs and production functions for generating products or 
services (defined as bundles of characteristics).  
– Each vendor maximizes its output offer (an optimal mix of the desired 
characteristics) subject to its particular budget constraint (which includes the 
DoD’s budget guidance and the vendor’s individual costs to produce a unit of each 
characteristic).  
– This is the product and/or service package (output) a particular vendor is able 
to propose for each possible budget (B), given its production function (technical 
production possibilities) and its costs of generating those characteristics. 
3) Third Stage: (Selection) 
With the latest budget forecast, the DoD selects among the optimized characteristic 
bundles proposed by each vendor the bundle/alternative (total product/service 
package) that maximizes the DoD’s utility function. 
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to create a scatter plot of effectiveness versus cost (see Figure 7). In the absence of any other 
information, the highest cost alternative a DM is willing to consider can be used as a notional 




















EEOA: “LEVEL THE PLAYING FIELD”
4. Modified Budget Approach (GOTO 1 & 3)
Modify alternatives to equalize budget 






Figure 7. Modified Budget Approach 
 
The fourth way to structure an EEoA recognizes that the highest-cost (highest-utility) 
alternative under consideration (for example, A2 in Figure 7) reveals a possible budget 
constraint. By “leveling the playing field,” the decision-maker asks how the extra money might 
be used by the lower-cost (lower-utility) vendor (A1) to increase the utility of that alternative 
(from A1 to A1*).34 Note that this effectively returns the problem to the first (and third) way of 
structuring an EEoA. 
5. Modified Effectiveness Approach 
Similarly, the fifth way to structure an EEoA levels the playing field for a threshold choice 
of utility (or effectiveness), returning the problem to the second (and third) way of structuring an 
EEoA. For example, in Figure 8, anchoring the desired MOE at a target level such as that 
offered by vendor 2, the government would return to vendor 1 and ask, how much would it cost 
to achieve the same target level of MOE? In Figure 8, vendor 1 is preferred since the response 
(A1=>A1*) minimizes the budget required. 
                                                
34 Alternatively, different valuable uses for the money saved by choosing the lower-cost alternative could 
be brought into the effectiveness calculation. Some will recognize this search for the “next best alternative 
use of funds” as the standard economic definition of opportunity costs. This sets the stage for the sixth 
way to structure an EEoA. 
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5. Modified Effectiveness Approach (GOTO 2 & 3)
Modify alternatives to equalize MOE 




Figure 8. Modified Effectiveness Approach 
 
6. Opportunity Cost (or Effectiveness) Approach 
Finally, what if 1) we cannot modify alternatives to obtain response functions, and 2) we 
don’t know, or cannot assume, a given budget or desired level of MOE? In this case, some 
alternatives (bundles) cost more but offer more effectiveness, while others cost less and offer 
less effectiveness (“efficient set”). The sixth and final way to structure an EEoA involves an 
inter-program comparison we call the Opportunity Cost Approach. 
Rather than modify the alternatives to level the playing field, the Opportunity Cost 
Approach accepts both lower-cost, lower-effectiveness alternatives (A1 in Figure 9) and higher-
cost, higher-effectiveness alternatives (A2) but requires a more challenging inter-program 
analysis.  
The main challenge in selecting an alternative in this context is that the DM must reach 
beyond the immediate program, A, into higher-level inter-program considerations (perhaps 
entering the requirements generation system or the PPBE process).  
If the alternatives are exogenously determined, and it is not possible to level the playing 
field, then to find the most cost-effective solution requires information about other competing 
programs (e.g., program B in Figure 9). “[T]he assessment should provide details as to how 
excess funding […] demands will be accommodated by reductions in other mission areas, or in 
other […] accounts” (DoD, 2006, July 7, Section 3.2.2). 
This involves an inter-program analysis similar to that illustrated in Figure 9. What is the 
loss in utility in other programs that might be sacrificed (B2=>B1) for the funds to be made 
available to purchase greater utility in the program under review (A1=>A2)? Alternatively, how 
much more utility might the extra money generate somewhere else if we went with the low-cost 
alternative (A1)? These are tough but useful questions that break through the sub-optimization 
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of most traditional AoAs. In this way, the EEoA approach encourages critical communication to 
take place between different layers of the organization.35  
6. Opportunity Cost Approach         
(INTER-PROGRAM Marginal Analysis)
A) Question: Where is the extra money coming from if I 
buy the high cost alternative? 










Program A Program B
 
Figure 9. Opportunity Cost Approach  
 
The bottom line is that it is often more transparent, efficient, and effective to develop 
MOEs that are independent of costs and to treat costs as an independent variable (CAIV). 
Equally important are the roles of budget (funding) forecasts and opportunity costs in helping 
structure defense investment decisions. Structuring an Economic Evaluation of Alternatives 
(EEoA) using one of the six approaches summarized in Table 1 could help achieve the primary 
goal of defense acquisition reform—to help coordinate the requirements generation system 
(JCIDS), Defense Acquisition System (DAS), and PPBE to lower the costs of defense 
investments and improve performance and schedules. 
Conclusion: A Decision Map for Decision-makers 
This study identified several major challenges that face current military cost-
effectiveness analyses. It also critically examined key assumptions of the decision sciences’ 
                                                
35 Fisher (1965) quotes Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara: “Suppose we have two tactical aircraft 
which are identical in every important measure of performance [MOE] except one—aircraft A can fly ten 
miles per hour faster than Aircraft B. Thus, if we need about 1,000 aircraft, the total additional cost would 
be $10million. If we approach this problem from the viewpoint of a given amount of resources, the 
additional combat effectiveness […] of Aircraft A would have to be weighed against the additional combat 
effectiveness which the same $10million could produce if applied to other defense purposes—more 
Aircraft B, more or better aircraft munitions, or more ships, or even more military family housing […] This 
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literature, which are frequently used by the military to structure acquisition decisions. An 
alternative micro-economic set of approaches to structure acquisition decisions was proposed, 
called the Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA). 
This study points to a significant weakness in the multiple-criteria, decision-making 
(MCDM) approach that underpins many contemporary AoAs. The weakness is that while MCDM 
techniques, and therefore most AoAs, correctly focus on lifecycle costs and the operational 
effectiveness of individual alternatives, affordability is often only implicitly addressed through a 
weight assigned to costs.  
In contrast, the EEoA approach recommended in this study encourages analysts and 
decision-makers to include affordability explicitly in the AoA. This requires working with vendors 
to build alternatives based on different funding (budget/affordability) scenarios. Supported by a 
static, deterministic, multi-stage, constrained-optimization, micro-economic production 
(procurement auction) model described in Section 3, this EEoA approach explicitly addresses 
affordability up-front. The key difference between the MCDM approach to AoA, and the EEoA 
approach, is that instead of modeling decision alternatives from competing vendors as points in 
cost-effectiveness space, the EEoA models alternatives as functions of optimistic, pessimistic 
and most likely funding (resource/budget) scenarios.  
The primary goal of this study was to help improve public investment decisions by 
providing a set of six approaches practitioners (acquisition officials and others) can employ to 
structure an Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA). An important secondary goal of the 
study was to develop a Decision Map to guide practitioners and acquisition officials in 
structuring cost-effectiveness analyses to improve defense acquisition outcomes. The Decision 
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Decision Map to Structure an Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA)
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